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## *Cease-Fire Developments*

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~~SECRET~~CAMBODIAThe Military Situation

Communist military activity east of Phnom Penh in the vicinity of the government's Mekong River base at Neak Luong remained at a high level on 23 May. A government battalion operating on Route 1 a few miles west of Neak Luong has been isolated by Communist forces, and Neak Luong itself was subjected to another heavy shelling. At last report, no positions near the base had been lost.

Government forces met no resistance in clearing Route 3 southward to the village of Tram Khnar, or in reopening a section of Route 4 northeast of Kompong Som that had been closed by Communist attacks on 21 May. Truck convoys between Kompong Som and Phnom Penh are to be resumed in the next few days.

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VIETNAM

Exiles Wooed by Both Sides

Both Saigon and Hanoi are seeking to improve their relations with Vietnamese exiles. [redacted]

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[redacted] last week that Thieu now recognizes that many of the exiles are opposed to his government, but are not necessarily pro-Communist. As part of a more conciliatory policy, Thieu has ordered a review of the cases of those expatriates living in France, the US and Japan, who have been "blacklisted" and prohibited from returning to South Vietnam. Thieu apparently believes that removing restrictions on some individuals can help to improve Saigon's standing among exiles in general.

Members of the North Vietnamese diplomatic mission in Paris are also under orders not to antagonize the exiles and to treat all Vietnamese in Paris in a conciliatory and courteous manner. Hanoi's charge in Paris [redacted] recently that discourteous conduct had given Vietnamese exiles a poor impression of North Vietnam. The charge claimed that the mission must be prepared for the coming of a peace settlement and that his staff might "even" be compelled to treat officials of the Saigon government amicably, because some of them might be in a new government formed after a peace agreement is signed.

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LAOSPheng Meeta with the Military

Government negotiator Pheng Phongsavan has been talking with senior Lao Army officers during the past two weeks about possible military concessions to the Communists. The officers [redacted] rejected any further concessions. They particularly objected to the Pathet Lao proposal for a formal demarcation of areas of control, which would give the Communists some territory now under government control. Pheng almost certainly anticipated these negative reactions, but nevertheless believed that it is politically prudent to at least go through the motions of consulting with the generals. [redacted]

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